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ARGUMENT 
THE GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY ACT REQUIRES THAT THE STATE 
SHOW MORE THAN BUT-FOR CAUSATION TO RETAIN IMMUNITY 
FROM LIABILITY. 
Before examining the State's arguments, it is important to 
note what the State does not argue in its brief. The State does 
not dispute Plaintiffs' contention that their interpretation of 
"arises out of" as a but-for test provides no meaningful limit 
to the exceptions from waiver in the Government Immunity Act, 
therefore creating an unworkable test (Pis. Br. at 14-15). The 
State does not dispute that "arises out of" is not viewed as 
but-for causation in the rest of the Utah Code (Pis. Br. at 15). 
The State does not dispute that Plaintiffs' interpretation is 
conceptually coherent; provides limits, and is more in line with 
the policy goals of the Act. Instead, the thrust of the State's 
argument is that, notwithstanding the general superiority of 
Plaintiffs' approach, the plain language rule and stare decisis 
demand that this Court endorse the State's interpretation of 
"arises out of" as only requiring only a but-for causal link 
between the injury and one of the exceptions to the general 
waiver of immunity in the Act. This argument is fundamentally 
incorrect. The State's interpretation is not endorsed by the 
plain language of the phrase "arises out of." The State's 
interpretation does not have stare decisis force, and even if it 
does, there is sufficient reason to overturn the precedent. 
1 
A. Plaintiffs' "integrally related'' test is the best 
way to determine whether an injury arises out of 
a condition or activity that is excepted from 
liability under the Act. 
As explained in Plaintiffs' opening brief, the "integrally 
related" test put forth by Plaintiffs is the best way to 
determine whether an injury arises out of one of the conditions 
or activities listed in subsection (5) of the Act, The first 
reason for this is that the alternate but-for test provides no 
clear limits to cut off the application of the exceptions listed 
in subsection (5) and is therefore conceptually incoherent as a 
test. Because the only limit for a but-for test is whether an 
excepted activity or condition was somewhere within the never-
ending chain of events, the exceptions overcome the basic policy 
of the Governmental Immunity Act: to allow individuals to 
recover damages caused by the negligent acts or omissions of the 
State and municipal governments. The State does not respond to 
this argument. 
The second reason for preferring Plaintiffs' interpretation 
is that the "integrally related" test is consistent with the 
other parts of the Utah Code and so is more likely to be the 
interpretation intended by the Legislature. The State argues 
that the plain language of the statute supports its 
interpretation, but this view is incorrect, as will be explained 
in Part B of this brief. 
2 
Yet another reason to prefer Plaintiffs' interpretation is 
that the but-for interpretation would mean that property seized 
for forfeiture purposes is subject to an ordinary duty of care, 
while property seized for evidentiary purposes is not subject to 
any duty of care. This is an inconsistent and absurd result. The 
State responds to this on page 11 of its brief, but 
misunderstands Plaintiffs' argument: the but-for test does not 
nullify the forfeiture statutes; however, the but-for test 
creates wildly different standards of care for property seized 
for different purposes without a rational basis for 
distinguishing between the two. The State fails to articulate a 
basis as to why the Legislature might think that property held 
by the State for civil or criminal forfeiture proceedings1 should 
be subject to an ordinary standard of care, while property held 
for evidentiary purposes should not be subject to any standard 
of care whatsoever. Plaintiffs can think of none. Absent a 
showing that the Legislature intended this result, the but-for 
interpretation leads to absurd results and so should be rejected 
by this Court. 
1. Contrary to the State's assertions, Title 2 4 applies 
to both civil and criminal forfeiture proceedings. Utah Code 
Ann. § 24-1-2 (1) . 
3 
Finally, this Court should prefer Plaintiffs' 
interpretation because the but-for test excuses total 
indifference on the part of government officials in caring for 
property of private citizens, including live animals. Though the 
State argues that the willful conduct of government officials is 
not immune from suit and that a § 1983 suit is an available 
remedy for violations of an individual's constitutional rights,2 
that misses the point. Endorsing the but-for test sends a 
message to government officials that they will not be held 
accountable for any damage to property in their possession so 
long as they do not intentionally destroy or damage the 
property. To read the law this way would be to "cloak the 
ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity in modern garb." Johnson 
v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 2006 UT 15, 1 19, 133 P.3d 402. 
Moreover, the practical effect of this ruling is easy to 
predict: when the incentive to care for an item decreases, a 
person will be less inclined to expend effort in taking care of 
that item. If the Court holds that government officials are 
immune from suit for negligent handling of items in their care 
if not held for forfeiture, then government officials have less 
of an incentive to take care of items in their possession. In 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create a cause of action for 
negligence. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986). 
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short, Plaintiffs7 interpretation preserves the accountability 
function of the Governmental Immunity Act and so this Court 
should prefer it to the State's but-for interpretation. 
B. The plain language of the statutory text does not 
support the State's interpretation of "arises out 
of" as only requiring a showing of but-for 
causation. 
In pages 9-13 of its brief, the State makes the argument 
that the plain language of the statutory text supports their 
interpretation. Utah appellate courts have long held that "in 
construing any statute, we first examine the statute's plain 
language and resort to other methods of statutory interpretation 
only if the language is ambiguous." Gull Laboratories v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 936 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Utah App. 1997). If 
the term to be interpreted is not defined in the statute itself, 
the Court should rely on the dictionary to decide the usual 
meaning of the term. Id. 
In this case, both parties agree that the issuance of the 
search warrant was a "judicial proceeding." The lower court 
relied on only the issuance of the search warrant as the basis 
for its ruling. The term to be interpreted is therefore "arises 
out of." This phrase is not defined in the statute itself, and 
the State provides no dictionary definition of the phrase. 
Plaintiffs have not found any dictionary definitions of the 
phrase in its entirety. The State's argument also seems to 
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contradict the many times that this Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals have relied on interpretive methods to divine the 
meaning of this term. See, e.g., Estate of Berkemeir v. Hartford 
Insurance, 2004 UT 104, ?SI 10-11, 106 P.3d 700; Viking Insurance 
Co. v. Coleman, 927 P.2d 661, 664-65 (Utah App. 1996); Taylor v. 
Ogden City School District, 927 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1996); 
Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission, 888 P.2d 707, 712 
(Utah App. 1994); National Farmers Union Property & Casualty v. 
Western Casualty & Surety, 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978). Prior 
cases make clear that the phrase "arises out of" is a legal term 
of art and not a term that has a plain meaning apart from case 
law. As explained in Plaintiffs' opening brief, Plaintiffs' 
interpretation of the phrase "arises out of" is more consistent 
with prior case law, and so should be preferred over the State's 
interpretation. 
The State also argues in the conclusion of its plain 
language argument that "when the facts are looked at in their 
entirety and when giving effect to each term in Section [63-30d-
301(5) (e)], Plaintiffs' claimed injury plainly ^arose out of 
the institution and prosecution of the judicial proceedings 
against Plaintiff Ryan Hoyer." Br. of State at 13. This 
conclusion is conceptually incoherent and only serves to confuse 
the issue. First, the lower court limited the operative judicial 
proceeding to the issuance of the search warrant. The State's 
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reference to some sort of other event that would have 
constituted a judicial proceeding was not decided upon below-the 
Court only found the cause of the damages arose from the search 
warrant: "but for the seizure of the snakes, plaintiffs would 
not have suffered any damages." (R. at 382). Second, The basis 
of Plaintiffs' appeal is the proper interpretation of "arises 
out of": if the phrase only requires a showing that but for the 
issuance of the search warrant, Plaintiffs' injury would not 
have occurred, then the lower court decided correctly. If, as 
the Plaintiffs suggest, the phrase requires more than that, then 
the Court should remand for the district court to apply the 
proper legal standard. The State's conclusion quoted above 
ignores the interpretive question entirely in favor of an 
intuitive, vague, "I know it when I see it"3 kind of test. With 
apologies to Justice Stewart, a clear interpretation of "arises 
out of" is needed for uniform application of the law and to 
reduce, rather than increase, litigation. 
However, it is possible that what the State meant in the 
quoted statement is that it would prevail under Plaintiffs' 
standard. The State does not analyze Plaintiffs' interpretation 
to argue why this is the case, and this would be unlikely given 
3. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
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the paucity of the findings in the lower court and the fact-
bound nature of the "'integrally related" test.4 Regardless of the 
findings of the lower court, there are facts that would be 
relevant under the Plaintiffs' standard that have not yet been 
reviewed by the district court. 
C. The court is not bound to accept the State's 
interpretation under the doctrine of stare 
decisis. 
4. The only finding that might support this argument 
would be that "the snakes were used as evidence against 
plaintiff Ryan Hoyer in both Davis County Justice Court and 
Clearfield City Justice Court." (R. at 382). As Plaintiffs have 
said in their previous brief, this finding is untrue, and was 
consistently denied by the Plaintiffs. It is a matter of public 
record that only the photographs of the snakes were entered into 
evidence. The State does not dispute this in footnote 3 of its 
brief. There was no evidence for this finding but only the 
State's assertion that this was an uncontested fact. Since this 
finding was not relevant for purposes of the State's motion or 
the lower court's order, this Court should not consider this 
finding, but rather remand the case to the district court to 
determine if the snakes were actually used as evidence along 
with instructions for the lower court to apply the correct 
standard. 
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On pages 14-17 of its brief, the State argues that stare 
decisis compels this Court to apply the but-for standard in 
determining the interpretation of "arises out of.7' The passage 
the State claims has stare decisis effect is from Taylor: uBut 
for the assault, Zachary's injuries would not have occurred." 
927 P.2d at 163. Plaintiffs have two responses to this argument: 
first, this statement is dicta and has no binding weight under 
the principles of stare decisis. Second, even if this quotation 
carries the weight of stare decisis, there is good cause for 
this court to overturn that precedent. 
The quoted passage from Taylor is not binding authority; it 
is merely dicta. Obiter dicta (or just dicta) is "[a] judicial 
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that 
is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not 
precedential." Black's Law Dictionary 1102 (8th ed. 2004). A 
passage in a judicial opinion is dicta if it was not an issue 
that was raised and briefed by the parties. 20 Am. Jur. 2d 
Courts § 134 (2005). 
As explained in Note 3 of Plaintiffs' opening brief, the 
issue of the scope of the phrase "arises out of" has not been 
raised or briefed by the parties on previous cases. Indeed, the 
degree of separation both in time and physical location between 
the injury and the act that the State relies upon for immunity 
is unprecedented for a case of this type. Because this Court has 
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never had the opportunity to interpret "arises out of" beyond 
ruling that it meant something broader than proximate causation, 
this Court should not feel bound by a simple mention of but-for 
causation in previous decisions. 
Also, as noted on page 20 of Plaintiffs' brief, but-for 
causation has not been a necessary element of previous cases 
decided by this Court. Previous cases would not have had a 
different result under Plaintiffs' standard than under a but-for 
standard. This not only shows that but-for causation was not a 
necessary part of the decision; it also shows that the Court has 
not had the necessity of considering the question presented by 
the Court in this case. Because of these reasons, the passage 
relied upon by the State is dicta and the Court should not give 
the passage stare decisis authority. 
But even if the Court decides that the passage relied upon 
by the State constitutes binding precedent, this does not end 
the inquiry. "Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; 
rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula 
of adherence to the latest decision." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808, 828 (1991). Therefore, when the Court is "clearly 
convinced that a rule was originally erroneous or is no longer 
sound because of changing conditions and that more good than 
harm will come by departing from precedent" it is justified in 
overturning that precedent. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 
10 
(Utah 1994); See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v, Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (items to 
consider in over ruling precedent include: workablility, the 
effect of the overturning of the precedent on those who rely 
upon it, whether the legal framework the precedent was based on 
has developed in such a way as to make the precedent an 
anachronism, and whether the factual framework of the precedent 
has changed to the extent that reliance on the precedent would 
be unjustifiable). To the extent that the but-for standard 
constitutes precedent, this Court should abandon that precedent 
and adopt Plaintiffs' standard. 
Even if the court concludes that the but-for standard has 
some precedential basis, it should abandon the but-for standard 
because it was erroneous in the first instance and unworkable in 
the present. As shown in pages 13-15 of Plaintiffs' opening 
brief, a but-for test does not work to limit the scope of the 
exceptions listed in the Act. A but-for test would explode the 
exceptions in the Act to the point that they would overwhelm the 
general waiver of liability. A causation standard that does not 
limit causation in any meaningful way is per se incorrect and 
fails as a workable standard to judge causation. 
Also, the fact pattern of the present case is so far 
removed from previous cases that it would be unjustifiable to 
rely on the precedent from those cases. In previous cases, the 
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injury was suffered in the same location and at about the same 
time as the excepted activity or condition. There was no 
question as to the remoteness of the exception. There was also 
no briefing by the parties about the question of remoteness. In 
the present case, the injury took place well after the issuance 
of the search warrant, and far removed from the point of the 
warrant's issuance or execution. Because the facts are so 
different from those used in concluding that but-for causation 
was appropriate in the former cases, a re-examination of this 
standard is appropriate. 
Furthermore, the law relied upon in articulating the 
interpretation for "arises out of" has been refined. As 
explained in pages 17-19 of Plaintiffs' opening brief, case law 
regarding the interpretation for "arises out of" has developed 
substantially since the interpretation in National Farmers that 
was subsequently relied upon by the Court in Taylor. Subsequent 
case law has shown the flaws of using but-for causation as a 
standard, and state courts have moved the law forward on a more 
equitable basis. The Court should be responsive to these 
developments and take the opportunity to refine the law in this 
context. 
Also, applying the but-for standard leads to results that 
are counter to good public policy, as explained on pages 15 and 
16 of Plaintiffs' opening brief and in part A of this brief. The 
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Court's continued endorsement of the but-for test would send a 
signal to government officials that they have no duty of care 
for property held as evidence. The consequences of such a signal 
must be considered by this Court in determining the standard 
that it will endorse. 
The countervailing interest of the State in preserving any 
potential precedents is slight. While overturning precedent 
necessarily prejudices the interest of those who have relied on 
the prior interpretation of the law, it would be difficult for 
the State to show such an interest in this case. This interest 
is at its highest in interpreting contract law, where parties 
negotiate in good faith and rely upon the stable meaning of the 
terms that they have chosen in planning a deliberate course of 
action. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828. In this case, the State has no 
reliance interest when the immunity is only for acts that are 
not intentional. In other words, the State cannot claim a 
reliance interest in the standard governing an accident. The 
State's interest in retaining precedent is therefore marginal to 
nonexistent. 
Finally, while it is true that it is usually left to the 
Legislature to overturn existing statutory interpretation, this 
Court has departed from previous interpretations of statutes 
upon good cause. Hackford v. Utah Power & Light, 740 P.2d 1281, 
1283 (Utah 1987) . The question for determining whether existing 
13 
statutory interpretation is so settled that it has become "has 
been woven into the fabric of the law." Id. at 1285. The 
interpretation in question has not achieved such status. As 
mentioned earlier, there are no decisions interpreting "arises 
out of" that have implicated the but-for test. This means that 
the Legislature has not relied upon such cases when considering 
whether revision was necessary. Also, this means that the 
Legislature has not relied on the stability of that decision in 
developing the surrounding statutory scheme. Finally, it is 
doubtful that previous cases have put the Legislature on notice 
of the potential problems with the but-for test. Therefore, 
their failure to act should not be viewed as deliberate 
inaction. 
The State's argument for stare decisis fails, both because 
the passage that it relies upon is dicta, and because there is 
good cause to overturn precedent in this case. The Court should 
adopt Plaintiffs' interpretation of "arises out of" in its 
interpretation of the Government Immunity Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' "integrally related" test is the best way to 
determine whether an injury arises out of an excepted activity 
or condition under the Governmental Immunity Act. This test is 
in line with the intent of the Legislature in passing the Act, 
is consistent with prior precedent, and is not foreclosed by 
14 
stare decisis. This Court should reverse the decision of the 
lower court and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
the correct legal standard. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22d day of August, 2008. 
iL 
Jathan Whittaker 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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